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Abstract
Recent empirical work on intergenerational transfers has shown that: i) parents prefer to
transfer resources to their children using bequests rather than inter vivos transfers (gifts),
and ii) bequests tend to be divided equally, while gifts tend to be directed towards the
less well-o¤ children. In this note, we present a theoretical model of the altruistic family
with heterogeneous children which does not contradict either i) or ii). In our setting, i)
follows because bequests are more e¢cient than gifts: these are negatively related to the
children’s reported income (true income cannot be observed) and therefore distort the e¤ort
supply decisions as well as inducing underreporting. As for ii), we propose two arguments.
First, market imperfections make bequests, which come late in life, a rather ine¤ective
redistributive tool, so that it may be pointless to di¤erentiate them. Second, imposing
the constraint that bequest have to be equal is not necessarily costly in welfare terms and
permits to avoid the the psychic costs or the loss of reputation associated with unequal
giving.
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JEL Classi…cation Number: D10, J10
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The empirical literature on intergenerational transfers (see e.g. McGarry 1999a, 1999b and the
references therein) has by now accumulated a fair amount of convincing evidence in favour of
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1two stylised facts:1
1. parents tend to transfer income to their children preferably in the form of bequests;
2. inter vivos transfers (gifts) are inversely related to the income of the children, while be-
quests are divided about equally (also in the absence of explicit legal rules to that e¤ect).
The …rst fact poses something of a puzzle, often studied in the literature. Why should
altruistic parents wish to postpone the date in which to make transfers to their children? Surely,
the period in which an average individual needs more help is not when her parents are about to
die, but much earlier, for instance at the age of marriage, when liquidity constraints can easily
arise. One should therefore observe relatively small bequests and a large amount of gifts, which
is not what occurs in practice. The existence of the second stylised fact makes the question even
more puzzling: if parents are altruistic, why do they use so little of the tool which is clearly
meant to perform a redistributive action?
A possible solution is of course to argue that intergenerational transfers are not always
motivated by altruism: for instance, bequests can be used strategically (Bernheim et al. 1985,
Cremer et al. 1992) in order to get more attention from one’s children, and therefore tend to
prevail over gifts.2 Our aim in the present paper will instead be that of exploring a possible
mechanism for reconciling the altruistic model of the family with the above-mentioned facts.
There are some recent contributions which have followed a similar route, most notably a paper
by Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000), in which the authors are able to show that rational, altruistic
parents will behave in complete accordance with the pattern suggested by the second stylised
fact, provided that i) the parents care about the reputation that their bequest behaviour will
give to them and, ii) gifts are private information, while bequests are public. This ”reputation
approach” is not in con‡ict with the one employed here – indeed, we shall make a connection
below; our focus will be however on the …rst stylised fact, i.e. the prevalence of bequests over
gifts. Plausibly, the reputation e¤ect and the mechanism explored in the present paper may
be seen as complementary forces, both contributing to explain why altruistic parents should
1Another stylised fact is that gifts tend to be used more frequently by wealthier parents (see e.g. Laitner
1997). Our model is silent on this issue, as we will not consider di¤erences among parents.
2The question whether the altruistic model is an appropriate description of actual behaviour has received a
great deal of attention in the literature. Empirical studies have reached mixed conclusions: for example, Cigno
and Rosati (1996) and Cigno et al. (1998) …nd support for non-altruistic models, whereas Hochguertel and
Ohlsson (2000) give evidence which is consistent with the altruistic model.
2indeed rationally behave in the way they actually do according to evidence.3
To our ends, we employ a model with altruistic parents and, importantly, heterogeneous
children, so that both equity and e¢ciency concerns arise. Indeed, we shall see that the equity-
e¢ciency trade-o¤ will play a crucial role in shaping our results. Our model incorporates at the
outset the following features:
² First, we postulate that gifts are used mainly for the purpose of easing liquidity constraints,
since they can be made when the problem arises (not later), whereas bequests are general
means of transferring resources without any speci…c aim. Therefore, gifts are directly
related to the children’s incomes, whereas bequests are not. This suggests that gifts tend
to be less e¢cient than bequests, as the former will distort the children’s e¤ort decisions.
However, bequests came later in life then gifts; since the usual imperfections in the capital
market prevent children to borrow against the bequests they will receive in the future,
t h e r ei ss o m ec o s ta s s o c i a t e dw i t hu s i n gb e q u e s t si n s t e a do fg i f t s .
² Second, we posit, realistically, that parents cannot observe their children’s incomes. This
creates an incentive problem: if inter vivos transfers are speci…cally meant to ease liquidity
constraints, the children may be tempted to lie with regard to the income they earn, in
order to obtain more help from their parents. Hence, gifts will have to be devised on the
basis of reported income, rather than actual income. This reinforces the distortionary
nature of gifts, as bequests, coming in a period of life where liquidity constraints are no
longer a problem, are less likely to induce opportunistic behaviour.
Hence, the strategy is to suppose from the start that, consistently with empirical evidence,
gifts (but not bequests) have a compensatory nature and check whether this may be compatible
with bequests being preferred for transferring resources from altruistic parents to their children4.
The paper is structured as follows. We set up the model in Section 2, and then discuss the
gift-bequest mix in Section 3. We …nd, either analitycally or by means of numerical simulations,
3Other contributions on the altruistic model of the family include Cremer and Pestieau (1996) and Jürges
(2000). Their analyses have the merit of showing that the altruistic model of the family is indeed compatible
with the use of a gift-bequest mix, as opposed to gifts alone (although the speci…c question whether gifts should
be used more than bequests or viceversa is not addressed). However, they suggest that bequests should have a
stronger redistributive content than gifts, which is in con‡ict with the empirical evidence cited above.
4A similar strategy is followed by McGarry (1999a). However, she does not model explicitly di¤erences in
children’s ability, since her model is one with representative individuals; therefore e¢ciency and equity issues are
not clearly separated in her analysis.
3that our model is indeed capable of predicting a transfer pattern which is in accordance with
observed behaviour, in the sense that there are plausible conditions under which i) bequests
turn out to be shared equally and gifts are negatively correlated with income, and ii) bequests
represent the largest proportion of all intergenerational transfers. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Children’s behaviour
Let us focus on a household made of a couple plus several children. To abstract from the
complexities of married life, we assume that the couple acts as if it were a single entity, which
we refer to as ”the parents”. The children may be of two types, i =1 ;2; there are ni children
of type i. They di¤er in ability, as represented by a parameter !: type-2 children have higher
ability, that is !2 >! 1 (in a competitive economy, ! would be the wage rate). Their income r
depends on the ability parameter and on e¤ort e:
r = !e: (1)
The parents can observe neither e nor r; instead, they observe !.T h a t i s , t h e p a r e n t s k n o w
whether their children are clerks or lawyers, but do not know how much e¤ort they put in
and how much they earn.5 Since the children know that the level of inter vivos transfers
depends negatively on income (according to a relation speci…ed below), they have an incentive
to underreport: if they exaggerate their di¢culties, the parents will be more generous. However,
lying to one’s parent is something which cannot be made without incurring in some costs, partly
psychological and partly due to the necessity to hide evidence of one’s actual income level. We
take it that if a child wants to hide a share ® of his or her income, the cost of concealing one
unit of income is some function c(®), so that the total cost is c(®)r (that is, concealment costs
are proportional to income). The function c(®) is assumed to satisfy the following restrictions:
c(0) = c0(0) = 0;c 0(®) > 0;c 00(®) > 0: (2)
Hence, reporting the truth is costless and concealing one’s income becomes more costly the
larger is the gap between actual and reported income. Thus, only a fraction
y =( 1¡ ®)r (3)
of the actual income is revealed to the parents.
5By contrast, Cremer and Pestieau (1996) assume that the parents observe r, but not e or !.
4There are two types of transfer. First, we have inter vivos transfers, which are a decreasing
function of reported income, g(y),w i t hg0(y) < 0; to simplify, we postulate a linear relation,
g = T (h ¡ y); (4)
where h is some target value of income and 1 ¸ T ¸ 0 is the transfer ”rate”; we shall refer to the
di¤erence h¡y as to the ”income gap”. Roughly, this corresponds to the idea that parents are
willing to make transfers if they perceive that their children do not have an ”adequate” income.6
The use of a more general gift function would only complicate the analysis, without changing
the general thrust of our arguments, which is essentially based on the compensatory (and hence
distortionary) nature of gifts, not on the exact form taken by their relationship with income.
Second, we have bequests, which di¤er from gifts mainly because they come rather late in life.
This makes them unsuitable for easing the consequences of liquidity constraints, because the
usual market imperfections prevent the children from borrowing against their future incomes
(i.e. their bequests). To express this, we take it that bequests are, in general, less valuable
than gifts of comparable amount; for any unit of income bequeathed to a child, only a fraction
0 <k· 1 actually accrues to the child (cf. Cremer and Pestieau 1996). It will be useful in





Note that {(1) = 0, {0 < 0 and lim
k!0
{ = 1: that is, the index is zero when the whole bequest
goes to the children and increases monotonically as the share lost in the passage increases.
The children’s utility is given by
u = u(z;e); (6)
where
z = r + T (h ¡ y)+kB ¡ c(®)r (7)
denotes consumption; (6) satis…es
uz > 0;u zz < 0;u e < 0;u ee < 0: (8)
6There might be some ”reputation e¤ect” at work here as well; the implicit assumption behind (4) is that
the parents would like their children to have a living standard which is comparable to that prevailing in their
r e f e r e n c eg r o u p .T h et a r g e tv a l u eo fi n c o m ew o u l dt h e r e f o r eb e… x e da c c o r d i n gt os o m es o c i a ln o r m–i tm u s tb e
high enough to let the children do the things the other people do. This would be consistent with the idea that a
social norm requires an externality to be established (see Coleman 1990).
5De…ne
!¤ = !(1 ¡ T (1 ¡ ®) ¡ c) > 0 (9)
as the net marginal reward for one unit of e¤ort, that is the ability parameter less the costs
given by the reduction of the gift and by the concealment activity. Then, maximizing (6) by





T = c0; (11)
where we have used (1), (3), (4), (7) and (9). The interpretation is straightforward: (10)
establishes the standard condition for optimal e¤ort supply, whereas (11) says that the optimal
degree of underreporting is the one at which the per-unit marginal costs equal the marginal
increase in the gift. Note that T =0implies, in view of (2), that ® =0 ; if there are no gifts,
the child says the truth concerning his or her level of income.
Let e e = e e(T;B;!), e ® = e ®(T;B;!) denote the solution to the child’s problem. For fu-
ture reference, we note here some comparative statics results (the Appendix gives details of
















where the upper bar denotes the compensated supply. (13) can be read as a decomposition
of the derivative of the ordinary supply into a substitution e¤ect ( @e








That is, a larger gift rate reduces the net reward for unit of e¤ort -see (9)-, and thus, if the child
i sc o m p e n s a t e di ns u c haw a yt h a th i so rh e ru t i l i t yl e v e li sc o n s t a n t ,t h i sm u s tb r i n ga b o u ta







6Hence, a larger bequest reduces e¤ort, for the simple reason that wealthier people work less;
this, together with (14) implies, from (13), that a larger gift rate reduces also the ordinary e¤ort
supply, because a rise in T brings about both a fall in the net reward for unit of e¤ort (so that
@e
@T < 0)a n da nincrease in the total gift received by the child ( @e
@B
h¡y











The degree of concealment only depends on the inter vivos transfer rate: the higher is T,t h e
more lucrative is misreporting, and thus ® goes up.
By plunging (??) back into the utility function (6), we can get the children’s indirect utility,
written Ã = Ã(T;B): Its derivatives w.r.t. the transfer parameters are
@Ã
@T
= uz (h ¡ y) > 0; (17)
@Ã
@B
= kuz > 0: (18)
3 The design of intergenerational transfers







where x denotes parental consumption and 0 <¸· 1 is a parameter capturing the degree of
altruism towards the children. The parents’ initial wealth w is assumed to be large enough to
guarantee positive transfers to the children. Given the structure of the transfer scheme, the
parents’ budget constraint will therefore be








Since the parents know their children’s abilities, they can make the transfer rates contingent
on type. Note that this implies that if bequest shares turn out to be (tendentially) equal, this
will be because of some endogenous mechanism: in principle, they can be di¤erentiated.
The parents’ problem is to choose
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7subject to nonnegativity constraints for all four variables.
Let L; ¿i and ¯i denote the Lagrangian and Lagrange multipliers of the nonnegativity
contraints, respectively; then, using (1), (3), (17) and (18), the …rst order conditions can be

















+ ¿i · 0; Ti ¸ 0;
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z + ¯i · 0;
Bi ¸ 0;
@L
@Bi¯i =0 ; (23)
3.1 General transfer schemes
Let us start by describing the transfer scheme in analytic terms. Assuming an interior solution,
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This equation represents the fundamental trade-o¤ faced by the altruistic parents when
devising their optimal transfer mix. Gifts are the source of two forms of distortion: they induce
the children to underreport their income and to alter their compensated e¤ort supply (neither
distortion would arise using bequests). The total e¤ect is expressed on the l.h.s. of (24) as the
transfer rate T times the percentage change in the income gap h¡yi; we can interpret this as a
measure of the loss associated with the use of gifts. On the r.h.s, we have instead a measure of
the cost of using bequests, de…ned as the index { times the change in the parents’ budget due
to a marginal increase in bequests (the term in parenthesis, which is unity plus the change in
the gift due to the increased bequest). Then, (24) says that at the optimum, transferring one
unit of income via bequest or via inter vivos transfers must be indi¤erent.
Simple inspection of (24) reveals that the sign of Ti is in principle ambiguous, as @e
@T < 0 by
(14); @e e
@B < 0 by (15) and @e ®
@T > 0 by (16); however, because of the nonnegativity constraints,
(24) actually holds if the optimal gift rates are strictly positive. We cannot establish analytically
that Ti is less than one, but in the numerical simulations we have carried out we never found
solutions in which Ti was larger than unity.
What can we say about the predictions of this model? Given the objective function of the
parents (a generalised utilitarian welfare function), and the assumption that children have equal
8tastes, there will be a tendency to equalise utility across children. The problem is whether this
redistribution is accomplished using prevalently gifts and whether bequests represent the largest
share of all transfers. Only if we …nd circumstances under which the answer to both questions
is ”yes”, we can say that our model does not contradict observed behaviour.
As for the …rst issue, we can argue the following. On the one hand, inter vivos transfers are
(imperfectly) tied to the children’s income, so that they could represent a valuable redistributive
tool: if they really perform this role, then the gift rate for low-ability children should be much
larger than that of the high-ability ones, and bequests should be approximately equal. On the
other hand, it is clear that bequests are more e¢cient that gifts, so this would be an argument
for using type-contingent bequest shares as a redistributive device: in that case, we should have
large di¤erences in bequests and small di¤erences in gifts. So, we expect that the …rst pattern
prevails when the greater e¢ciency of bequests is counterbalanced by a high incidence of market
imperfections: if the index { takes a large value, bequests become very costly and therefore
gifts should be used more extensively.
As for the second issue, the reasoning is relatively straightforward. With k =1and thus
{ =0 ,w eh a v ef r o m( 2 4 )t h a tTi =0 : in a world without market imperfections, ability-
contingent bequests serve both e¢ciency and equity purposes and therefore gifts are redundant.
Since however market imperfections make bequests less valuable than gifts, the parents switch
partially to the latter in order to redistribute in favour of the low-ability children, but still tend
to use bequests as much as possible. In general, we expect that our model will be consistent
with the empirical prevalence of bequests over gifts in most cases, because of the two distortions
associated with the use of gifts.
Unfortunately, it is di¢cult to con…rm the above arguments analytically; therefore, we try
and gain some insights into the matter …rst using numerical simulations and then considering
a special case.
3.2 Numerical simulations7
Assume that the children’s utility function is log-linear,
u = ° lnc +( 1¡ °)ln(1¡ e); (25)
w h e r ew eh a v en o r m a l i s e dt ou n i t yt h em a x i m u mp o s s i b l ee ¤ o r ta n d0 <°<1. For our exercise,
we choose ° =0 :8: Also, let the cost function be quadratic in ®, c = ®2: Finally, assume that the
7All the simulations in this paper have been carried out using Maple V.
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type-1 child 3:36 31:91 17:71 78:62 0:35





A numerical example with an ability-contingent transfer scheme
(T1 =0 :48; B1 =3 2 :56; T2 =0 ;B2 =2 8 :40)
parents’ utility is also logarithmic in consumption, v(x)=l n ( x): Then, setting the parameters
as follows:8
n1 =2 ;n 2 =1 ;w=3 0 0 ;! 1 =5 0 ;
!2 =8 0 ;k=0 :8;h =8 0 ;¸ =0 :9;
we …nd that the optimal transfer scheme is:
T1 =0 :48; B1 =3 2 :56; T2 =0 ; B2 =2 8 :40:
In this case, gifts seems to prevail as redistributive instruments: the gift rate for high-ability
children is zero, while bequests are only slightly higher for the low-ability children.
Other considerations may be made on the basis of the …gures reported in Table 1. Inter-
estingly, utility and consumption leves are almost equalised across children despite the large
di¤erence in income (type-2 children earn more than three times as much as type-1 children):
indeed, the utility ranking is reversed, as low-ability children have higher welfare than high-
ability ones! This happens because the two types have, as we said, similar consumption levels,
but low-ability children work very little because they receive a huge gift (e¤ort levels are re-
ported in the tables in the Appendix). Clearly, the ability-contingent transfers constitute a
very powerful redistributive scheme. It is also con…rmed that bequests represent the largest
proportion of total transfers.
To test the robustness of our results concerning the role of the two types of transfer and
on the composition of total transfers, we have performed several comparative statics exercises
8A fuller range of results for this and other parameter con…gurations are reported in the Appendix.






benchmark case ¡ 31:91 0:350 0:300 0:59
increased skill dispersion !1 =4 0 4 8 :63 0:325 0:350 0:40
wealthier parents w =4 0 0 3 4 :89 0:335 0:330 0:70
less altruistic parents ¸ =0 :83 1 :39 0:350 0:300 0:57
equal number of children n2 =1 3 4 :45 0:510 0:490 0:74
less market imperfections k =0 :91 1 :53 0:385 0:230 0:86
Table 2:
Total gifts and bequest shares for some alternative con…gurations
on our benchmark parameter con…gurations: summary results are reported in Table 2. From
Table 2 one sees that bequests are divided about equally among the children in all cases but
one: for the ”wealthier parents” and ”equal number of children” variants, the shares are almost
identical. The exception is, unsurprisingly, the ”less market imperfections” case. This con…rms
that gifts acquire a redistributive role only because market imperfections make bequests less
valuable: when k is close to one and the transfer scheme is contingent on type, redistribution
is accomplished mostly through bequests.9 Another pattern which emerges from Table 2 is
that bequests always account for more than half of total transfers (with a peak of 86% in the
”less market imperfections” case), except for the ”increased skill dispersion” case. This can
be explained by noting (from the Appendix) that in this variant of the simulation model, the
low-ability children are extremely poor: it is therefore perfectly rational for altruistic parents
to use gifts rather than bequests.10
3.3 A special case
We focus now on the special case in which the parents treat their children as if they were
equal, applying the same transfer rates to all of them, i.e. setting Ti = T and Bi = B,a l li.
9As a further check, we computed the optimal transfer scheme for the case in which k =1 . It turns out that,
with all the other parameters as in the benchmark case, B
1 =6 6 :76,a n dB
2 =3 6 :76 (with T
1 = T
2 =0 ). That
is, the two low-ability children get 39% each of the total estate, and the high-ability one is left with only 22%.
10The ”increased skill dispersion” case is interesting also because is the only one in which the largest bequest
share goes to the high-ability child. This is reminiscent of a result in McGarry (1999a), which found that, in same
cases, bequests could be positively correlated to the child’s income. The explanation in our model would be that
ah i g h e rB
2 is needed to counterbalance the enormous di¤erence between the gifts, which is in turn motivated
by the extreme poverty of the low-ability children.
11This guarantees at the outset that bequests, if used, will be equal across children, as we saw is
usually the case in the real world. This may be criticised as unduly restrictive (equal bequest
shares should be explained, not assumed), but there are at least two reasons why we wish to
investigate this case. First, it has been often argued that di¤erentiated bequests may cause
what are usually referred to as the psychic costs of unequal giving (see e.g. McGarry 1999b
for a brief review of the literature), and therefore, there may be circumstances under which the
welfare loss associated with the use of uniform transfers is outweighed by these costs. Second,
we have already mentioned a recently advanced argument according to which the parents may
wish to preserve their reputation by avoiding di¤erentiated bequests (Lundholm and Ohlsson
2000); in this case, the practice of equal bequest share should be seen as a ”social norm” that
cannot be violated without costs.
The parents’ optimization problem in this case is to choose T and B so as to
















subject to nonnegativity constraints for the two variables. In principle, this may be solved to
yield the optimal values of T and B. We expect that both bequests and gifts are used at the
optimum; in the various simulations that we have performed (on which more presently), we al-
ways found positive levels of both T and B. Bequests represent an e¢cient way of transferring
resources, but, being constrained to be equal across children, are not very helpful where redis-
tribution is concerned; gifts, on the contrary, are distortionary, but are well-suited for helping
the less well-o¤ children in a direct way.
The relevant question, of course, is whether uniform schemes are consistent with the two
main facts that characterise observed behaviour, namely the negative correlation between gifts
and incomes and the prevalence of bequests over gifts.
As for the …rst point, it is indeed immediate to establish the following result:
Claim 1 When a uniform transfer scheme is implemented, low-ability children receive a larger
total gift.
Proof. With Ti = T and Bi = B,a l li, we get from (12), (15) and (16) r2 >r 1 and
®1 = ®2. Hence, y2 >y 1 and T(h ¡ y1) >T(h ¡ y2).
This way, we have that uniform transfer schemes reproduce exactly real-world intergenera-
tional transfer patterns, in that gifts are larger for the less well-o¤ children, while bequests are
equal (by construction).
12individual ui gi ri zi
type-1 child 3:29 23:67 18:41 71:02





A numerical example with a uniform transfer scheme








benchmark case 0:38 1:04 0:35 0:60
increased skill dispersion 0:49 3:01 0:53 0:44
wealthier parents 0:39 1:54 0:45 0:69
less altruistic parents 0:38 1:36 0:33 0:57
equal number of children 0:34 1:06 0:33 0:73
less market imperfections 0:17 0:37 0:12 0:85
Table 4:
Gift rates, gift/income ratios and bequests/total transfers ratios for some alternative
con…gurations
As for the issue of the prevalence of bequests over gifts, it is di¢cult to say something in
general. We therefore resort to numerical simulations. For our benchmark simulation model, it
turns out that the optimal uniform scheme is:
T = :38, B =3 1 :75:
Other variables are reported in Table 3, from which we see that utility and consumption levels
for children are much less diverse than incomes: so, we …nd a con…rmation of the equitative role
of the inter vivos transfers, even if the gift rates are constant across children. Indeed, although
the total gifts do not seem to di¤er very much in absolute size, the low-ability children receive
a gift that is larger than their income, while this is not true for the high-ability ones. We also
see that total bequests are larger than total gifts.
F r o mT a b l e4w es e et h a tt h ea b o v er e m a r k so nt h er e d i s t r i b u t i v er o l eo fg i f t sa p p l ye q u a l l y
13Description VV
General scheme Uniform scheme
benchmark case 13:94 13:92
increased skill dispersion 13:87 13:84
wealthier parents 14:59 14:57
less altruistic parents 12:95 12:93
equal number of children 11:34 11:33
less market imperfections 14:04 14:03
Table 5:
A comparison of parental utilities across schemes for some alternative con…gurations
well to all the variants which we investigated, with one important exception:11 in the ”less
market imperfections” case, both child types receive a gift which is smaller than their income.
This re‡ects the fact that, with k approaching unity, the greater e¢ciency of bequests makes
them the most appropriate way of transferring resources through generations: actually, we see
that this is the case in which bequests represent the largest share of total transfers (85%).
Bequests always account for more than half of total transfers, except for the ”increased skill
dispersion” variant, for the same reasons as in the general case (see above).
Finally, it is instructive to compare the results reported in Table 3 with those of Table 1.
Note that the redistributive power of the general scheme is superior, as we do not observe the
reverse utility ranking under the uniform scheme; the bequest shares and the bequest/total
transfers ratio are instead almost identical. This loss of redistributive content for the gifts is
clearly due to the constraint that the gift rate is equal across children. Despite this, parental
utility is only slightly inferior when a uniform scheme is used: the di¤erence is negligible. This
is a potentially relevant …nding, as it suggests that the welfare loss associated with the use of
uniform schemes, as opposed to fully di¤erentiated schemes, is actually tiny. For the functional
forms used in this paper (logarithmic utilities, quadratic concealment costs, utilitarian welfare
function), this proved to be a robust result; some cases are reported in Table 5. A possible
reason for this is that the total amount transferred to the children does not vary much across
schemes: parental consumption is slightly lower in the uniform scheme case, but the di¤erence
is irrelevant. With equal tastes and equal welfare weight ¸ for the children, and an additive
11Predictably, the gift rate reaches a peak for the ”increased skill dispersion” case, in which the low-ability
child is extremely poor (see the Appendix); for this case, we also …nd the highest gift/income ratio.
14welfare function, di¤erences in consumption among children do not count much in terms of
overall welfare as long as the total resources are the same.
4 Conclusions
In this note, we have tried to characterise intergenerational transfer schemes within the altruistic
model of the family. Since we assumed heterogenous children, both e¢ciency and equity issues
arise. The basic feature of our model is that bequests are taken to be the most e¢cient way
of transferring resources through the generations, as they only have an ”income” e¤ect (make
people wealthier): by contrast, inter vivos transfers (gifts), being explicitly aimed at easing
liquidity constraints, distort the e¤ort supply decisions as well as inducing underreporting of
income (this latter e¤ect follows because income is not observable, and therefore the parents
design their transfers schemes on the basis of reported income). In this context, we are able to
show that there are plausible circumstances in which the optimally designed transfer schemes
involve i) a prevalence of bequests over gifts, and ii) higher gifts for the low-income children
and approximately equal bequest shares. Both results are consistent with observations.
The driving forces behind our …ndings are two. First, we assumed that, due to usual
market imperfections (namely, the impossibility of borrowing against future income), one unit of
bequests is worth less than one unit of gift for the children (see Cremer and Pestiau 1996). This
makes bequests unsuitable for equity purposes, even when the parents are capable and willing to
give di¤erent bequest shares to di¤erent children. Second, we took gifts to be compensatory from
the start; this makes them highly redistributive but also inherently ine¢cient tools. Hence,
parents do use inter vivos transfers for equity purposes, which is ii) above; however, they do
this only to the extent that it is necessary, and still transfer as large a proportion as possible of
their money via bequests, to avoid the double cost associated with the use of gifts (distortion of
e¤ort supply and underreporting of income), which is i) above. This points out to the existence
of market imperfections and the distortionary nature of gifts as two simple and straightforward
explanations of the commonly observed pattern of intergenerational transfers, and is consistent
with the notion that parents act in perfectly rational way when deciding how much money they
should leave to their children and in what form.
Alternatively, we can explain the occurence of equal bequest shares by noting that, in some
cases, the welfare loss of uniform schemes, which avoid the so-called psychic costs of unequal
giving or the loss of reputation associated with di¤erentiated bequests, is tiny. These schemes
15yield a pattern which in complete accordance with observed behaviour, in that gifts are always
larger for the low-income children and bequests are always shared equally. Moreover, they entail
almost no welfare loss, at least for the speci…c assumptions that we made in our simulation
model: this would be a strong motivation for altruistic parents to resort to uniform schemes.
Appendix
Comparative statics. The child maximises
U = u(!e+ T (h ¡ (1 ¡ ®)!e) ¡ c(®)!e+ kB;e); (27)
by choice of e and ®. Note …rst that our assumptions on the shape of the utility and cost-
of-misreporting functions ensure that the second order conditions for the child maximisation






> 0. Assume now that
uez · 0: (28)
Then, we can compute:
UeT = uzz (h ¡ y)!¤ + uz (® ¡ 1) + uez (h ¡ y) < 0; (29)
UeB = uzzk!¤ + uezk<0; (30)
U®T = uzr>0; (31)
U®B = U®! =0 ; (32)

































16which is (16). Furthermore, we have that
















It is immediate the identify, by standard arguments, the …rst term on the r.h.s. of (39) as the








Simulations results. In each subsection of this part of the appendix, the …rst table gives more
information on the benchmark model (n1 =2 ;n 2 =1 ;w=3 0 0 ;! 1 =5 0 ;!2 =8 0 ;k=0 :8;
h =8 0 ;¸=0 :9), while the other tables report the same …gures for the other variants used in
the text. Notice that the qualitative remarks we made in the text for the benchmark case apply
e q u a l l yw e l lt oa l lt h eo t h e rc a s e s .
General schemes
Table A1 - Benchmark case
(T1 =0 :48; B1 =3 2 :56; T2 =0 ;B2 =2 8 :40)
individual ui ®i ei gi ri yi zi Bi
§iniBi ci
type-1 child 3:36 0:24 0:35 31:91 17:71 13:46 78:62 0:350 0:06
type-2 child 3:26 0 0:74 0 59:46 59:46 86:28 0:300 0
Vx §iniBi
§iniBi+§inigi
parents 13:94 142:67 0:59
Table A2 - Increased skill dispersion (!1 =4 0 )
(T1 =0 :63;B1 =2 1 :28;T2 =0 ;B2 =2 3 :24)
17individual ui ®i ei gi ri yi zi Bi
§iniBi ci
type-1 child 3:37 0:31 0:08 48:63 3:50 2:41 68:82 0:325 0:10
type-2 child 3:21 0 0:75 0 60:28 60:28 78:87 0:350 0
Vx §iniBi
§iniBi+§inigi
parents 13:87 136:93 :40
Table A3 - Wealthier parents (w = 400)
(T1 =0 :49;B1 =5 3 :90;T2 =0 ;B2 =5 2 :72)
individual ui ®i ei gi ri yi zi Bi
§iniBi ci
type-1 child 3:53 :24 0:22 34:89 11:25 8:50 88:59 0:335 0:60
type-2 child 3:42 0 0:69 0 55:56 55:56 97:74 0:330 0
Vx §iniBi
§iniBi+§inigi
parents 14:59 169:70 0:70
Table A4 - Less altruistic parents (¸ =0 :8)
(T1 = :48;B1 =2 8 :87;T2 =0 ;B2 =2 4 :21)
individual ui ®i ei gi ri yi zi Bi
§iniBi ci
type-1 child 3:32 0:24 0:38 31:39 18:82 14:32 72:23 0:350 0:06
type-2 child 3:22 0 0:75 0 60:13 60:13 79:43 0:300 0
Vx §iniBi
§iniBi+§inigi
parents 12:95 155:26 0:57
Table A5 - Equal number of children (n2 =1 )
(T1 =0 :49;B1 =5 0 :74;T2 =0 ;B2 =4 9 :12)
individual ui ®i ei gi ri yi zi Bi
§iniBi ci
type-1 child 3:51 0:24 0:24 34:45 12:21 9:24 86:53 0:510 0:60
type-2 child 3:40 0 0:70 0 56:14 56:14 95:44 0:490 0
Vx §iniBi
§iniBi+§inigi
parents 11:34 165:69 0:74
18Table A6 - Less market imperfections (k =0 :9)
(T1 =0 :20; B1 =5 4 :42; T2 =0 ;B2 =3 2 :84)
individual ui ®i ei gi ri yi zi Bi
§iniBi ci
type-1 child 3:42 0:10 0:48 11:53 24:04 21:67 84:32 0:385 0:01
type-2 child 3:32 0 0:73 0 58:09 58:09 87:65 0:230 0
Vx §iniBi
§iniBi+§inigi
parents 14:04 135:25 0:86
Uniform schemes
Table A7 - Benchmark case
(T =0 :38; B =3 1 :75)
individual ui ®e i gi ri yi zi B
B§ini c
type-1 child 3:29 0:19 0:46 23:67 22:79 17:71 71:02 0:33 0:04
type-2 child 3:39 0:19 0:58 16:21 46:79 37:80 86:69 0:33 0:04
Vx B§ini
B§ini+§inigi
parents 13:92 141:19 0:60
Table A8 - Increased skill dispersion (!1 =4 0 )
(T =0 :49;B=2 4 :36)
individual ui ®e i gi ri yi zi B
B§ini c
type-1 child 3:27 0:24 0:29 34:76 11:54 8:73 65:09 0:33 0:06
type-2 child 3:38 0:24 0:54 22:96 43:54 32:93 83:39 0:33 0:06
Vx B§ini
B§ini+§inigi
parents 13:84 134:50 0:44
Table A9 - Wealthier parents (w = 400)
(T =0 :39;B=5 3 :67)
19individual ui ®e i gi ri yi zi Bi
B§ini c
type-1 child 3:47 0:20 0:34 26:09 16:96 13:63 85:32 0:335 0:04
type-2 child 3:55 0:20 0:51 18:51 40:96 32:91 100:81 0:330 0:04
Vx B§ini
B§ini+§inigi
parents 14:57 168:34 0:69
Table A10 - Less altruistic parents (¸ =0 :8)
(T =0 :38;B=2 8 :00)
individual ui ®e i gi ri yi zi B
B§ini ci
type-1 child 3:25 0:19 0:48 32:27 23:78 19:23 68:58 :33 0:04
type-2 child 3:37 0:19 0:60 15:84 47:78 38:63 84:27 :33 0:04
Vx B§ini
B§ini+§inigi
parents 12:93 153:62 0:57
Table A11 - Equal number of children (n2 =1 )
(T =0 :34;B=4 9 :68)
individual ui ®e i gi ri yi zi Bi
B§ini c
type-1 child 3:41 0:17 0:41 21:65 20:42 16:92 81:21 0:50 0:03
type-2 child 3:50 0:17 0:56 14:82 44:42 36:80 97:68 0:50 0:03
Vx B§ini
B§ini+§inigi
parents 11:33 164:17 0:73
Table A12 - Less market imperfections (k =0 :9)
(T =0 :17; B =4 6 :81)
individual ui ®e i gi ri yi zi B
B§ini c
type-1 child 3:34 0:09 0:53 9:81 26:50 24:17 78:23 0:33 0:01
type-2 child 3:47 0:09 0:63 6:00 50:50 46:06 98:20 0:33 0:01
Vx B§ini
B§ini+§inigi
parents 14:03 134:00 0:85
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